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Freedom of Expression and
Choice of Language*
LESLIE GREEN

This paper argues that sound principles of freedom of
expression protect an individual's choice of which language to
speak. They do so, not to guarantee against mistranslation, but
rather to ensure that speakers are able to reach their intended
audiences and, more importantly, to allow for the expressive
value of speaking a particular language as a symbol of ethnic
or political identification. The example of Quebec's Charter of
the French Language and the resulting litigation is considered
in some detail.

I. THE PROBLEM

In linguistically divided countries, governments often regulate
the use of language: they make some languages official, they
restrict others, they impose linguistic requirements on educational
or professional qualifications, and so on. My question is this: Do
sound principles of free expression direct or constrain such
regulation?
The issue is a familiar one to Canadians whose federal
government requires the use of French and English for certain
*

Versions of this paper were read to a conference on freedom of expression at
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, and at the Boalt Hall School of Law, University
of California, Berkeley. I am grateful to the participants, and to the editors and referees
of this journal for helpful criticism.

purposes, and whose provincial governments have often restricted
one or the other. Historically, French and languages other than
English bore the brunt of deliberate repression, but nationalist
governments in Quebec have recently turned the tables and
banned, in certain contexts, the use of English and other
languages. Quebec's Charter of the French Language, for
example, made French the sole official language of that province,
and prohibited non- French commercial publicity, firm names and,
with certain exceptions, public signs.

1

In a series of important and highly controversial judgments, the
Supreme Court of Canada struck down some of these provisions as
inconsistent with the guarantees of free expression found both in
the entrenched Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
also in Quebec's provincial human rights statute. These decisions
were generally admired by English Canadians and, not surprisingly,
deplored by the Quebec French. In consequence, the government
of Quebec used its power under the Charter to derogate from the
free expression guarantees, a decision that they may, in retrospect,
have regretted. That action quickly polarized public sentiment
and was among the factors making it impossible for Quebec to
secure the agreement of all the majority-anglophone provinces on
constitutional amendments which would have given it more control

over its cultural affairs. Perhaps the linguistic division of opinion
on the cases was to be expected. More surpris- ing, however, was
the political division, for the decisions did not attract much
support from liberal and left-wing academics either. They were
dis- appointed to see the Court protecting commercial expression
and to see it assisting a historically powerful group (English
Quebeckers)

against

a

historically

weaker

one

(French

Quebeckers). Groups who are normally friends of free expression
were thus surprisingly hostile to the Supreme Court's defense of
it in these cases.
Part of the puzzle is explained by the fact that these cases
involved commercial signs and that there are many liberals
whose commitment to free expression does not reach that far. But
it is, I think, quite wrong to let one's views about commercial
expression occlude the broader issue here. First, some of the
grounds on which Quebec defended its legislation (for instance, that
its government enjoyed "democratic legitimacy," i.e. was elected)
would permit the restriction of non-commercial expression as well.
Second, some Quebec nationalists thought - and still think - that
the impugned legislation did not go far enough in restricting
English. Finally, the will to regulate more broadly was in any
case manifest in the proposal of the Montreal Catholic School

Commission to ban languages other than French from the
playgrounds and corridors of their schools. None of this is
resolved by one's views about commercial expression, so by
focusing solely on that aspect liberals lost the opportunity to test
their views more fully.
Still, it is not obvious that a sound view of free expression
should protect choice of language. (And here I mean morally, and
not just legally, sound.) Indeed, some Canadians regard that
suggestion as a kind of legalistic joke, rather as if one argued that
the Oleomargarine Act, in requiring margarine to be dyed orange,
wrongfully discriminates on grounds of color. But I want to
suggest that this is mistaken and that free expression does properly
extend so far as to protect choice of language.
Principles of free

expression protect expressive

acts

by

imposing dis- abilities or duties on people, and they do so in
order to protect such acts. The question whether freedom of
expression

protects

choice of

language thus needs to be

distinguished from a broader question: Are there any principles
of political morality that direct or constrain the regulation of
language?
The questions are importantly different. Governments should
not, for instance, act irrationally. Since there is no evidence that

Quebec's restrictions on external commercial signs would do
more good than harm that is enough to impugn them, at least
morally and perhaps constitutionally as well. But that is not an
argument from free expression. Likewise, it is wrong to pay
English-speaking workers more than French-speaking workers
when language is irrelevant to the job. But the wrong is one of
discrimination, not the violation of freedom of expression.
Again, it would be wrong to punish people for speaking French
at home. But the evil here is just that in prohibiting a
harmless activity it restricts their personal liberty.
Principles of rationality, non-discrimination, and personal
liberty will in such ways often protect language use indirectly,
as fallout from their central aims. Free expression plays an
independent role only if it enhances these protections, if it
protects language beyond what can be expected from other
principles of political morality (Greenawalt, 1989: 9-10). That
is the sort of principle I want to explore here.
I follow Scanlon in regarding an expressive act as "any
act that is intended by its agent to communicate to one or
more persons some proposition or attitude" (Scanlon, 1972:
206). Expressive acts are thus all those that bear the
communicative intentions of some agent, whom for sake of

simplicity we shall call the speaker. This must not, however,
be taken to imply that all expressive acts are speech acts:
writing, signalling, playing music, painting etc. can all be
expressive, as can some criminal acts, including acts of
terrorism and civil disobedience. Much fruitless debate in
political theory is inspired by the narrow language of the First
Amendment to the American Constitution which protects
"freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." This has given rise to
many unedifying attempts to distinguish speech and action.
In contrast, section 2 of the Canadian Charter, like many
other human rights documents, casts the net more broadly to
catch: "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,
including

freedom

of

press

and

other

media

of

communication" (Canadian Charter, 1982). That is, I think, a
better way to demarcate the territory. Such unity as exists in the
area flows, not from the fact that these are all in some obscure
sense forms of "speech," but rather that they are all
expressive.
Generally, an act counts as expressive only if it attempts to
get others to understand or share some proposition or attitude,
and only if it does this communicatively, that is, by trying to
get them to recognize that it is done with that intention. 2 I say,

"proposition or atttitude," because it would be a poor and
excessively rationalistic view of human communication to
think that it only serves the communication of truths. The
contents of communicative acts are quite diverse: we attempt to
communicate to others, not only propositions or ideas to be
believed, but attitudes and values to be shared. In the case of
artistic expression, for example, communicative intent is hardly
ever propositional. Attitudes, values, and dispositions all enter
into our common life in important ways and are transmitted
in part through their expression. In any case, so far as the
Charter is concerned, the cognitive and the affective are both
accommodated by the language itself which distinguishes the
terms "thought," "belief " and "opinion" from the more
general notion of "expression."
The reasons for protecting such acts are, I believe, several
and are grounded in the interests of speakers, of their
audiences, and of the general public. Attempts to reduce these
intersecting and sometimes competing considerations to a
3

monistic theory have not met with great success, for a cluster
of different kinds of interests is at stake here. Surely
consequentialist considerations, such as J.S. Mill's claim that
free expression promotes knowledge of the truth, have weight

(Mill, 1962: chap. 2). At the same time, it fosters and expresses
both collective and individual autonomy: it serves democratic
decision making, artistic and cultural endeavor, the expression
of individual identity, and so on. Interestingly, the Supreme
Court of Canada has explicitly endorsed such a pluralistic
account of the grounds of free expression (Irwin Toy at 97677; Ford at 712) and that is the view I shall adopt here.
I do want to reiterate, however, that the interests at stake in
free expression are not, on this view, just individual ones. They
have an important social dimension, recognition of which is,
contrary to the allegations of some theorists, deeply rooted in
the liberal tradition. Mill, for example, held that: "Were an
opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner;
if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a
private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury
was inflicted only on a few persons or on many" (Mill, 1962:
142). But, he continued, the restriction of opinion harms not
just the individual but the public interest, and it is not just for
the sake of a single speaker that we protect expression. To
prevent even one person from speaking is wrong, not mainly
because of the value of this liberty to her or to him, but
because of the contribution it makes to the common good.

Meiklejohn took the public interest justification even further,
denying

the

speaker's

interest

any

independent

moral

importance at all: "What is essential is not that everyone should
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said"
(Meiklejohn, 1960: 26). Of Course, principles of free expression
do not require that everyone should speak; at most they require
that everyone has the opportunity to speak or remain silent.
And the connection between what is worth saying and what is
worth protecting is more complex than Meiklejohn allows. We
do not want to claim that a speaker's interest in uttering a
banal, commonplace ideal should count for little merely on
the ground that, having been said before, its contribution to the
public interest is slight. Indeed, a single-minded concern that, as
Meiklejohn puts it, "everything worth saying shall be said,"
could easily lead to the violation of what we normally think of
as paradigm rights of free expression. We do not believe that
only those things worth saying should be permitted to be said
nor even that scarce resources should be apportioned among
speakers according to how socially valuable their views are.
Moreover, in some cases we do regard it as important that
everyone has an opportunity to speak,

even if that means that the amount of time devoted to the
worthless and the worthwhile is about the same. Meiklejohn
thought his argument a democratic one, but the notion that
everyone should speak in fact has deep roots in democratic theory,
beginning with the classical Greek notion of isogoria. While the
public interest is essential to understanding the f ull importance of
freedom of expression, there is also an individual interest that
cannot be discounted.

II. MEDIUM AND MESSAGE

There is an objection, however, to thinking that choice of
language should be protected by such principles. They protect
expressive acts in virtue of their expressive character; but not all
features of such acts are expressive. For example, it is commonly
thought that free expression does not protect the time, manner, or
place of expression. Thus the regulation of radio frequencies, or
the quality and supply of paper during war time, or the
chemical additives present in artists' paints and materials, may all
have effects on the character and quality of expressive acts, and

may at the margin even inhibit some forms of expression and
promote others. But, according to the proposed distinction they
would count as regulation of the media of communication only
and not of the message itself. These normally bear, the argument
goes, on the form rather than content of expression. Likewise, it
may be said, whether the medium of expression is French,
English or Cree, the message remains invariant, so restrictions of
medium need not offend principles of free expression.
That was how one Canadian court saw the issue. In Irwin
Toy, a case testing the constitutionality of legislation restricting
advertising directed at children, Hugessen, A.C.J. introduced a
distinction which was to prove pivotal. He said, "The late Dr
McLuhan notwithstanding, message and medium are, in law, two
very different things" (Irwin Toy at 58). He held that a legislature
which regulates or restricts the medium in which some message
is communicated is not regulating or restricting the message itself
and thus cannot be said to be regulating or restricting any
expressive act.
This reasoning also dominates the trial judgment in Devine
which, though overturned on appeal, nicely puts the objection
we now consider. Dugas, J. applied the distinction between
medium and message to the case of language: "Language, after

all, is nothing more than a code of written or oral signs, used by
those who know it to communicate with each other" (Devine at
375). Prohibiting the use of a particular code, he stated, does not
therefore interfere with the communicative intention, for any
other code might be used to express the same propositions or
attitudes. Hence "Freedom of expression does not include the
freedom to choose the language of expression" (Devine at 379).

There are many interesting and important aspects of these
judgments that we need not consider here. What I do want to
focus on is the central distinction between medium and message
and the use to which it was put. The reasoning seems to have gone
something like this:

1. Only expressive acts are candidates for the protection of
freedom of expression;

2. A language is nothing more than a content-neutral code;
3. Thus, restricting the choice of language cannot restrict any
expressive act.
Now I have already endorsed (1) and suggested some of the
reasons one might have for protecting such acts, so let us turn to
(2). The word "code" which I draw from the judgment is

unhappy, suggesting as it does an artificial medium used in place
of a natural language. The fact that the same meaning may be
borne by a sentence spoken in English and the same English
sentence sent over the wire in Morse code would hardly suffice to
establish the semantic equivalence of that sentence and its best
French translation. There are codes and then there are "codes."
We must take care not to become enchanted with the jargon of
some fashionable linguistic theory. The sense in (2) just amounts
to this: it is roughly true that anything that can be said in English
can also be said in French. But, as we shall see below, the fact
that this is only roughly true allowed the Supreme Court of Canada
in Ford to reject (2) and the inference drawn from it. That result
was not too surprising, for there were plenty of other clouds on the
horizon for this distinction, at least as a matter of law.
First, medium of communication is expressly mentioned in the
Charter as being included in the guarantees of section 2. It is true
that, in that context, the central cases of such media are the press
and airwaves, but neither the language of the constitution nor the
decided cases inhibits its development by analogy. Even if medium
is distinct from message, in at least some cases the Canadian
constitution finds reasons for protecting both.
Second, the following words of an earlier Supreme Court

judgment suggest a view of language as something more than a
content-neutral code:
The importance of language rights is grounded in the
essential role that language plays in human existence,
development and dignity. It is through language that we
are able to form concepts; to structure and order the
world around us. Language bridges the gap between
isolation and community, allowing human beings to
delineate the rights and duties they hold in respect of one
another, and thus to live in society. (Reference re:
Manitoba Language Rights at 19)
Finally, and perhaps most important for present purposes, this
view of language seemed inconsistent with the very statute the
trial judge was attempting to interpret. For its preamble opens
with the ringing declaration that "the French language . . . is the
instrument by which that people [i.e. Quebeckers] has articulated
its identity" (Charter of the French Language, 1977). As
Boudreault, J. shrewdly observed in the trial judgment in Ford ,
this makes it very difficult to suppose that the legislators
conceived of language merely as a neutral code and thus that they
intended that the Act should regulate its use only in that respect

(Ford at 724).
So in deciding as it did, the Supreme Court certainly had a
reasonable footing: nothing in Canadian law prohibited their
finding that freedom of expression includes the freedom to
choose one's language and there was enough directing them along
that path. But was it, in the end, a wise decision? Can it be
defended in principle? I turn now to examine three arguments to
that conclusion.

III. A SEMANTIC ARGUMENT

One of the arguments the Supreme Court accepted, and one that
has an obvious appeal, is to deny the premise of the objection.
If it is wrong to think of a natural language as a content-neutral
code, then it is wrong to think that regulating the code is not
regulating content. Thus, in Ford the Court unanimously rejected
(2) in the following words:
Language is so intimately related to the form and content of
expression that there cannot be true freedom of expression
by means of language if one is prohibited from using the
language of one's choice. Language is not merely a means

or medium of expression; it colors the content and meaning
4

of expression. (Ford at 748)
The Court thus exploits the inevitable haziness of the boundary
between medium and message. That what can be said in French
can also be said in English is only roughly true because choice of
language colors the content and meaning of expression. Language
is not, therefore, a content-neutral code.
Was the Court right about that? It is true that the expressive
power of language varies, and that exact synonymy may be
unavailable in some cases. Considering cultural resonance and
sonorities, it would be hard to say that there are no semantic
differences between the roughly equivalent idioms, "filer a
l'anglais" and "to take French leave." Language does in such cases
color the meaning of the expression.
But is this sufficiently important and pervasive to bring choice
of language

under

the

comprehensive

protection

of

free

expression? I do not think so. Valerie Ford's offense, after all,
was to have displayed the word "wool" alongside "laine" in the
window of her wool shop. It is surely not to secure against any
possible semantic slippage that we would defend her right to
freedom of expression. This is not to deny that such slippage can
occur, even in the context of commercial signs. A "depanneur"

is not exactly a "convenience store." The differences in meaning
are real; but they are occasional and do not matter much. If we
are about to impose duties and disabilities on people as a matter of
general policy we must make sure that the stakes are high enough
to warrant it. To show that language does in some cases flavor
the meaning of expression will not warrant adopting a general
policy of protecting choice of language just in order to catch such
cases of heteronymy. The availability of circumlocutions, or the
adoption of some foreign words and terms, would be a
satisfactory alternative.
For this reason the tempting analogy with obscenity is
misguided. One might initially be inclined to regard choice of
natural language as being on a par with choice of tone or force
and, reasoning along the lines of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Cohen v. California, argue that to restrict language is to restrict a
whole mode of communication. But to exclude obscene or vulgar
speech from the protections of free expression is to remove a
distinctive tool, one which might prove useful or even necessary in
circumstances that cannot easily be isolated in advance5. The
potential heteronymy of French and English near-equivalents is
neither as pervasive nor as unidirectional as the power of vulgar
speech, so the analogy is unhelpful. There just isn't a general

linguistic tone or pragmatic effect that accrues to speaking
English in the way that one might be thought to accrue to speaking
vulgarly. So while it is certainly true as a descriptive matter that
semantic slippage occurs, it is hard to endorse the normative
thesis that this is what ought to bring choice of language under
the protective umbrella of free expression.

IV. AN INSTRUMENTAL ARGUMENT

A better route to the protection of choice of language is surely
the instrumental one. Restricting the use of certain languages
simply cuts off potential audiences or makes it more difficult to
reach them, and that harms one of the core interests underlying
freedom of expression on any plausible account.
To take a clear example: suppose a government restricted the
language in which political commentary might appear in the
newspapers, requiring that all published criticism of its policies
be in Ojibway, while favorable comment could be in any
language. What matters here is not the possible semantic slippage,
but the closing down of channels of communication by restricting
both speakers and their potential audiences.

Now this argument bears, one must concede, less heavily on
requirements than on prohibitions. Canada's Official Languages
Act of 1969, for example,

requires

various

officials and

government agencies to use both French and English, and
Quebec's Charter of the French Language makes wide use of such
requirements in order to promote the use of French in the working
world. And they do so partly for instrumental reasons that are
ultimately based on audience interests. The Charter of the French
Language, for example, seeks to establish French as the normal
working language of commerce and government in Quebec thereby
directly protecting the substantial interest that the francophone
majority has in being able to understand communications of all
sorts. It is important to note, moreover, that the audience interest
is not exhausted by the immediate benefits of intelligible
communication. It is well-known that patterns of language use
will also have substantial secondary effects on people's life
chances, including their opportunities for education, occupational
advancement, and social and geographic mobility.
Now, in the case of intended audiences, speakers will
generally aim to communicate in a language that the audience
understands. We should not, however, assume on that basis that
everyone's interests can be best served without any regulation of

language at all. The free market can fail in language as it can
elsewhere. When the audience is linguistically fragmented there
may be complex problems of coordination involved in finding a
common language. When minorities are bi- or multilingual there
is the potential for collective action problems in sustaining the
use of minority languages, and there is the risk of majorities
oppressing linguistic minorities. Nonetheless, it is easy to see
why speakers have an interest in the freedom to use the language
that they feel is best suited to their audiences. Unintended
audiences

also

have

an

interest

in

the

intelligibility

of

communication, however. It matters not only what others say to
you, but what is being said generally. Since speakers have
weaker, and in some cases no, incentives to serve the needs of
unintended audiences, this may provide another reason for
required use.
Might one argue that forcing someone to use a language other
than the one he or she would otherwise use in that context limits
the speaker's choice of medium and therefore must, at the very
least, call for a persuasive justification? To assess this claim, one
must investigate more closely the structure of speaker's interest.
In part, it derives from the intended audience's interest in
intelligible communication: the intention to reach them is

frustrated if one cannot do so. But we are not now considering
a case in which the speaker's audience is limited by prohibition,
but only a case in which the potential audience is expanded. A
requirement that commercial signs and publicity be in French as
well as another language, for example, does not inhibit the
speaker's capacity to communicate with the audience at which the
signs are directed. Could a speaker wish that a certain audience
not receive a particular communication? No doubt, although
plausible cases will turn, not on freedom of expression, but on
the right to privacy.
The instrumental argument for protection

for choice of

language is thus an important one, though it may fail in some
circumstances. Widespread individual bilingualism, or even the
availability of convenient translation, lessens its force. A more
discriminating policy of protecting choice of language where it is
necessary for effective communication might answer to the same
concerns and have fewer costs. And over time languages can be
learned, so the need to do so stimulates investment in language
learning. Quebec's language regime weighs less heavily on the
anglophone community now than it would have done twenty years
ago. Such are the limitations on the instrumental argument, so it
seems unlikely that general protection for choice of language

could be completely defended on instrumental grounds alone.
V. AN EXPRESSIVE ARGUMENT

There is, however, a third and independent reply to the objection
that

language

is

merely

a

non-expressive

medium

of

communication, one noticed though not much elaborated by the
Supreme Court. Choice of language should be protected because
it is an expression of identity and individuality:
It is, as the preamble of the Charter of the French
Language itself indicates, a means by which a people may
express its cultural identity. It is also the means by which
the individual may express his or her personal identity
and sense of individuality. (Devine at 375)
This is an aspect of the romantic, as opposed to rationalist,
tradition in free expression. Its context is not the forum or
marketplace of ideas, but rather the organic relations between an
individual and his or her community. I say this is an independent
objection, for it may succeed even where the instrumental
argument fails, and even when the thesis of content-neutrality
holds. Returning now to the argument set out in section 2, above,
we can see a further mistake. The thesis of content-neutrality does

not show that a natural language is "nothing more than a code."
Compare the following inference:

4. A flag is a piece of cloth,
5 . Therefore, a flag is nothing more than a piece of cloth.
The conclusion does not follow because a flag can be both a piece
of cloth and something more than a piece of cloth. Likewise, a
language can be a content-neutral code and something more
than a content-neutral code. If the something more makes it
expressive, then the fact that it may also appropriately be
described as a neutral code cannot change that.
To be still more precise, we do not even need to show that
language is something more than a neutral code in order to
justify the protection we want to accord it. Even if it were true that
a natural language is nothing but a neutral code, and even if
restrictions on language would not restrict the potential audience,
the argument given above would still be invalid. For consider:

6. Choice of language is a candidate for protection of free
expression only if it is an expressive act;

7. Language is nothing more than a neutral code;
8. So, freedom of expression does not include freedom to choose
language of expression.

Even if (7) were true, (8) would still not follow, for (8) is about
choice of language, and not about language itself. The error thus
lies not just in the arguable falsehood of (7), but in an
equivocation between "language" as an abstract entity and
"choice of language" as an act. Invoking again our earlier
analogy, we might compare:

9. Waving a flag is a candidate for protection of free
expression only if it is an expressive act;
10. A flag is nothing more than a piece of cloth;
11. So, freedom of expression does not include freedom to
wave a flag.

Here, the fallacy is patent, for the supposed truth of (10)
plainly has nothing whatever to do with (11). A flag, like a
language, is not an act of any kind, let alone an expressive
one. But speaking a particular language, like waving a flag, is
indeed an act and very possibly expressive. Thus, the purported
distinction between medium and message is irrelevant. The
fact, if it be one, that medium and message are two different
things does not even begin to show that choice of medium
cannot be intended to convey a message.

It is important to distinguish

between the expressive

argument defended here and the semantic argument that I
rejected above. Suppose it were permitted to say "Long live a
free Quebec!" but prohibited to say " Vive le Quebec fibre!"
What is most significant: the fact that there are nuances of
meaning, historical and cultural resonances, poetics of sound
present in " Vive" but absent from "long live"? I doubt it. The
significance of choice of language here lies not in what it says
but in what it shows. Saying it in French is a doubly political
act, for the propositional content is backed up by the fact that
the utterance displays the legitimacy of the language and its
relation to nationhood.
The argument we are pursuing is a normative one, but it
does depend on certain social facts. It fails unless it actually is
the case that language use has a social or individual meaning.
This cannot be established a priori. But at least in Canada
there is plenty of evidence that in many contexts it does. As I
said earlier, the expressive function of language was not
missed even by the legislators. The Charter of the French
Language begins, "Whereas the French language, the distinctive
language of a people that is in the majority French-speaking, is
the instrument by which that people has articulated its identity.

. . ."6 What is distinctively nationalistic here is merely the
suggestion that a group of people who are only "in the
majority" francophone constitute "a people." The reality in a
pluralistic society is that language choice permits each people
to express its identity. The way this is done is largely a social
creation, governed by convention, context and history.

7

In

Canada, choice of language bears a number of meanings, of
which ethnic identification and political affirmation are the
most important.
Those who choose to use a particular language often thereby
signal their sense of identification with an ethnic or cultural
group. This is most commonly true of minority language
speakers in circumstances where use of their language imposes
some social or economic cost. The language establishes a link
with an intended audience, a link which simultaneously invokes a
boundary between those inside and those outside the group. This
mark of distinction is often a source of value to minority
language speakers, and legitimately so. Notice that ethnic
identification

may be expressed

even by those who are

monolingual minority-language speakers. The notion of "choice"
in play may well be an attenuated one. For language use to have
the expressive character I have attributed to it, it is not

necessary that a person deliberately use one language and avoid
another in circumstances where options are available. The
expressive act need not be, for example, speaking Italian instead
of English, but simply speaking Italian instead of remaining
silent or allowing others to speak on one's behalf.
Language may also be an expression of political identity.
Quebec's policies of francisation express not only a boundarydefining sense of common feeling, but also a political position
which celebrates the distinctiveness of Quebec society and its
aspirations for autonomy. It is no accident that minority language
use is often a political

marker, and not surprising that

suppression of such languages is often undertaken with political
aims in mind. The various forms of compulsion to which
Estonian, Croatian, or Welsh speakers have been subject by their
governments was motivated by a desire to suppress social
formations which embody and promote nationalist
8

politics. That repression was unjust, but it was not ill-informed:
use of those languages was indeed a political act.
Here again, the consequences of requiring the use of a certain
language are likely to differ from those of prohibiting the use of
others. The decision not to use a particular language may in some
circumstances be expressive: it may be an act of resistance. In

other cases, it may be understood that to use a particular language
is not necessarily to identify with the ethnic group whose
language it characteristically is, nor to endorse any political
view. A language may simply be, and be understood to be, a lingua
franca. More- over, the burden of required use may be partly
alleviated by the division of labor. Organizations like companies
and bureaucracies may have the power to arrange their affairs so
that, for example, only those willing to use English must do so.
And where the regulations apply directly to individuals, they often
do so only for limited contexts and purposes. This is not to deny
that required use is ever onerous. When language has become
politically charged with the burden of nationality, use of language
is almost inevitably an expressive act. Both prohibitions and
requirements on use limit that expression, though generally in
different degrees.
Unlike the semantic thesis, the expressive thesis is pervasive: the
use of a language may have an expressive function without regard
to subject matter. The sign in Valerie Ford's shop had a social and
political significance quite apart from its semantic content. Indeed,
Quebec nationalists have often correctly noticed that the use of
English by merchants is not purely a matter of commercial
expediency but is in part a collective non placet, sometimes even a

political provocation. To denounce it in one breath and then in
the next defend prohibitions on English on the ground that they
merely regulate a neutral code is either blindness or hypocrisy.
Since this expressive character may break out at any point,
even on a commercial sign, there seems to be no way one might
adopt narrower protections to serve the same ends. Unlike the
instrumental argument, the expressive argument is capable of
supporting broader principles. The strongest objection to this
argument is rather different. It is that the interests at stake are
not sufficiently weighty or general to warrant holding others dutybound to protect them or disabling them from infringing them. Is
that a credible position? The power of ethnicity and nationality in
organizing personal identity, the widely felt need for rootedness,
and the structuring power of culture all suggest that identification
with an ethnic group may be a substantial human good.
Expressing such identification is good to the extent that it
constitutes, reinforces and adapts it.
Perhaps one might object that these interests, though powerful,
are purely private. A follower of Chafee, for example, might be
tempted in that direction. He saw the underlying values of free
expression to be these:
There is an individual interest, the need of men to

express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is
to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment
of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the
wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way.
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(Chafee, 1964: 33)
Ignoring the social interest, Chafee thought, leads people
systematically to underestimate the importance of free speech.
But his view of what the social interest actually comprises is an
implausibly narrow one. The expressive need is not merely
individual, nor is the social interest merely that of attaining the
truth. Sound public policy is to be guided, not merely by the true,
but by the good. There is a common interest in a regime which
enables and supports the expression and exploration of ethnic
identities, at least when these help structure valuable forms of
life. Not only is this good in itself, but it indirectly contributes to
a climate of ethnic tolerance and to the public good of linguistic
security, so that each may speak his or her mother tongue without
unfair pressure to conform. The expressive interest is thus of
general value and not what Mill called a "personal possession;" its
violation is not merely a "private injury" (Mill, 1962).
It is here, I think, that one finds the deepest and most important
roots of free expression and why, of the three arguments I have

canvassed, the expressive one is so important in completing the
case for protecting choice of language.
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also has research interests in the politics of language and culture.

NOTES

1. The Original Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-11, provides that "Except as
may be pro- vided under this act or the regulations of the Office de
la langue franraise, signs and posters and commercial advertising
shall be solely in the official [i.e. French] language." Similarly, s. 69
prohibits non-French firm names. Section 58 exempts publicity
carried in publications circulating in languages other than French,
and
religious,
political,
ideological
or
humanitarian
communications provided that they are not of commercial character
(s. 59). Nor does it apply to small businesses of less than four
employees, to publicity for the cultural activities of non-French
ethnic groups, or to business specializing in foreign or ethnic
goods.
2. The qualification is necessary because an act can try to get others to
share a belief in some other way. If A wants B to think it is cold in
the room, A can achieve this communicatively, e.g. by telling B that
it is cold, or non-communicatively, e.g. by opening a window and
making B cold. The second does not require for its success that B
recognize A's intention in opening the window, and thus is not a
communicative act in the sense under discussion here.
3. Alexander Meiklejohn, for instance, thought that speech should be
protected only when it can be reliably thought to promote selfgovernment. Thus it excludes commercial radio broadcasts: "The
radio, as we now have it, is not cultivating those qualities of taste,
of reasoned judgment, of integrity, of loyalty, of mutual
understanding upon which the enterprise of self-government
depends. On the contrary, it is a mighty force for breaking them
down" (Meiklejohn, 1960: 87). What would he have thought of
comic books, pop music, or television?
4. There is in fact a complication in the judgment, for while the
above passage suggests that choice of language is protected
because regulation of language is regulation of content, the Court
also says that the reference in s. 2 to freedom of "thought,"
"belief," and "opinion" shows that the Charter's protections go
beyond what it calls "mere content," or at least "content of

expression in its narrow sense."

5. Cf. Kopyto per Corry, J.A., at 226: "Hyperbole and colourful,
perhaps even disrespectful language, may be the necessary
touchstone to fire the interest and imagination of the public to the
need for reform, and to suggest the manner in which that reform
may be achieved." Per Goodman, J.A., at 259: "The expression of
an opinion which may be lawfully expressed in mild, polite,
temperate, or scholarly language does not become unlawful
because it is expressed in crude, vulgar, impolite, or acerbic
words."
6. The equally authoritative French version reads: "Langue distinctive

d'un peuple majoritairement francophone, la langue franraise
permet au peuple quebecois d'exprimer son identite."
7. The context-dependence of meaning provides an illustration of the
limits of abstract argument in political philosophy. One cannot
resolve these issues solely by appeal to our concepts of
'expression,' 'language,' etc. It is no thesis of mine that choice of
language is always, universally, or necessarily protected by
principles of free expression. I am merely trying to identify cases
in which it is. Does this need to attend to context suggest that
language is ill-suited for protection by constitutionally entrenched
rights? I make no claims about that here: the question turns on
the nature of rights, and on moral and institutional arguments for
putting certain matters beyond the reach of ordinary politics. The
issues are well-known. But I might note one general point. One
might object that, in view of the social character of our interests in
language, it must be an inappro- priate matter for rights, for they
only protect individuated interests. The objec- tion is too hasty,
for it elides a number of interestingly different ways in which
interests may fail to be fully individuated. For example,
individuals may have rights to certain collective goods. See, Green
(1991) and cf. Reaume (1988).
8. Political affirmation is often but not always coincident with ethnic
identification. Some bilingual Canadians use their second official
language in post offices or at border crossings in order to make a
political statement without thereby intending to express any sense
of ethnic identification with the other group.
9. The passage refers to the interests protected by the First
Amendment to the American Constitution, but there is no
evidence that Chafee thought that there were any important
expressive interests not protected by that document.
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